Strong managers, weak owners : (Record no. 12074)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 04229nam a22002537a 4500
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20231128110129.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 231128b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 0-691-03683-7
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency DDC
Language of cataloging eng
Transcribing agency GUL
Modifying agency TOSD
043 ## - GEOGRAPHIC AREA CODE
Geographic area code n-us---
082 00 - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 658.15 ROE
Edition number 22
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Roe, Mark J.,
Dates associated with a name 1951-
Authority record control number https://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n94034741
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Strong managers, weak owners :
Remainder of title the political roots of American corporate finance /
Statement of responsibility, etc. Mark J. Roe.
264 #1 - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture Princeton, N.J. :
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer Princeton University Press,
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice [1994]
264 #4 - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice ©1994
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent xvi, 324 pages ;
Dimensions 24 cm
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE
Media type code n
504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE
Bibliography, etc Includes bibliographical references (pages 289-308) and index.
505 00 - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Title The Economic Paradigm --
-- Diffuse Ownership as Natural Economic Evolution --
-- Fragmentation's Costs --
-- The Political Paradigm --
-- Diffuse Ownership as Political Product --
-- A Political Theory --
-- The Historical Evidence --
-- Banks --
-- Insurers --
-- Banks Again --
-- Mutual Funds --
-- Pension Funds --
-- The Contemporary and Comparative Evidence --
-- Takeovers --
-- Corporate Ownershiphin Germany and Japan --
-- A Small Comparative Test of the Political Theory --
-- Counterpoint I --
-- Political Evolution in Germany and Japan? --
-- Trends in the United States --
-- An American Crossroads --
-- Policy Recommendations --
-- Managers as the Problem? --
-- Short-Term Finance as the Problem? --
-- Industrial Organization as the Problem? --
-- Counterpoint II --
-- Changing the American Ownership Structure?
520 1# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. "The distinctive character of corporate business enterprise in the United States - large firms guided by powerful, centralized managers, historically deferential directors, and distant shareholders - is usually thought to be the inevitable result of economic and technological forces. In this major reinterpretation of the origins and evolution of corporate structure, Mark Roe shows that the nature of the American corporation derives not only from these forces but also from political decisions that made alternative forms of organization costly or illegal. Drawing upon work in economics, history, law, and political science, Roe argues that the role of politicians in mediating the interaction between firms and financiers is a critical, but neglected, part of the explanation why certain forms rather than others prevailed." "In their classic 1932 study, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means argued that the separation of ownership and control was the consequence of industrial technologies requiring large-scale production, which in turn led to highly dispersed stockholding. Roe demonstrates, however, that the ownership structure of the American corporation represents just one of several possible outcomes, and that other organizational forms arose abroad (in Germany and Japan, for example) under the influence of different political conditions. At a number of critical junctures, political choices were made about how savings were to be channeled to industry that sharply restricted the power of financial institutions to shape the growth of large firms. These decisions, which pre-dated the New Deal, going as far back in some cases as the nineteenth century, reflected the American public's enduring dislike of concentrated financial power. Once these rules for the governance of financial institutions were in place - but not before - the Berle-Means corporation became inevitable." "In recent years, new technological and competitive challenges have forced many of America's largest firms to restructure, often painfully. Some are now more efficient and productive, others are not. Relationships among shareholders, directors, and senior managers remain in flux, and tensions over whether shareholders are to have a greater or smaller voice in corporate management in the future may become acute. If history is any guide, Roe suggests, the issue will eventually be settled not only in boardrooms and on stock exchanges but also in statehouses and in Congress."--Jacket.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Corporations
Geographic subdivision United States
Authority record control number https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85032958
General subdivision Finance.
Authority record control number https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2002007885
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme Dewey Decimal Classification
Koha item type Book
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Date acquired Source of acquisition Inventory number Total Checkouts Full call number Barcode Date last seen Price effective from Koha item type
    Dewey Decimal Classification     Main Library West Wing Main Library West Wing 28/11/2023 Donation 0042159   658.15 ROE GU-MLW23110020 28/11/2023 28/11/2023 Book

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