MARC details
000 -LEADER |
fixed length control field |
04229nam a22002537a 4500 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
control field |
OSt |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
control field |
20231128110129.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
fixed length control field |
231128b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
International Standard Book Number |
0-691-03683-7 |
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
Original cataloging agency |
DDC |
Language of cataloging |
eng |
Transcribing agency |
GUL |
Modifying agency |
TOSD |
043 ## - GEOGRAPHIC AREA CODE |
Geographic area code |
n-us--- |
082 00 - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER |
Classification number |
658.15 ROE |
Edition number |
22 |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Roe, Mark J., |
Dates associated with a name |
1951- |
Authority record control number |
https://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n94034741 |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
Title |
Strong managers, weak owners : |
Remainder of title |
the political roots of American corporate finance / |
Statement of responsibility, etc. |
Mark J. Roe. |
264 #1 - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Princeton, N.J. : |
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
Princeton University Press, |
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
[1994] |
264 #4 - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
©1994 |
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
Extent |
xvi, 324 pages ; |
Dimensions |
24 cm |
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
Media type code |
n |
504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE |
Bibliography, etc |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 289-308) and index. |
505 00 - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE |
Title |
The Economic Paradigm -- |
-- |
Diffuse Ownership as Natural Economic Evolution -- |
-- |
Fragmentation's Costs -- |
-- |
The Political Paradigm -- |
-- |
Diffuse Ownership as Political Product -- |
-- |
A Political Theory -- |
-- |
The Historical Evidence -- |
-- |
Banks -- |
-- |
Insurers -- |
-- |
Banks Again -- |
-- |
Mutual Funds -- |
-- |
Pension Funds -- |
-- |
The Contemporary and Comparative Evidence -- |
-- |
Takeovers -- |
-- |
Corporate Ownershiphin Germany and Japan -- |
-- |
A Small Comparative Test of the Political Theory -- |
-- |
Counterpoint I -- |
-- |
Political Evolution in Germany and Japan? -- |
-- |
Trends in the United States -- |
-- |
An American Crossroads -- |
-- |
Policy Recommendations -- |
-- |
Managers as the Problem? -- |
-- |
Short-Term Finance as the Problem? -- |
-- |
Industrial Organization as the Problem? -- |
-- |
Counterpoint II -- |
-- |
Changing the American Ownership Structure? |
520 1# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
Summary, etc. |
"The distinctive character of corporate business enterprise in the United States - large firms guided by powerful, centralized managers, historically deferential directors, and distant shareholders - is usually thought to be the inevitable result of economic and technological forces. In this major reinterpretation of the origins and evolution of corporate structure, Mark Roe shows that the nature of the American corporation derives not only from these forces but also from political decisions that made alternative forms of organization costly or illegal. Drawing upon work in economics, history, law, and political science, Roe argues that the role of politicians in mediating the interaction between firms and financiers is a critical, but neglected, part of the explanation why certain forms rather than others prevailed." "In their classic 1932 study, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means argued that the separation of ownership and control was the consequence of industrial technologies requiring large-scale production, which in turn led to highly dispersed stockholding. Roe demonstrates, however, that the ownership structure of the American corporation represents just one of several possible outcomes, and that other organizational forms arose abroad (in Germany and Japan, for example) under the influence of different political conditions. At a number of critical junctures, political choices were made about how savings were to be channeled to industry that sharply restricted the power of financial institutions to shape the growth of large firms. These decisions, which pre-dated the New Deal, going as far back in some cases as the nineteenth century, reflected the American public's enduring dislike of concentrated financial power. Once these rules for the governance of financial institutions were in place - but not before - the Berle-Means corporation became inevitable." "In recent years, new technological and competitive challenges have forced many of America's largest firms to restructure, often painfully. Some are now more efficient and productive, others are not. Relationships among shareholders, directors, and senior managers remain in flux, and tensions over whether shareholders are to have a greater or smaller voice in corporate management in the future may become acute. If history is any guide, Roe suggests, the issue will eventually be settled not only in boardrooms and on stock exchanges but also in statehouses and in Congress."--Jacket. |
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Corporations |
Geographic subdivision |
United States |
Authority record control number |
https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85032958 |
General subdivision |
Finance. |
Authority record control number |
https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2002007885 |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Dewey Decimal Classification |
Koha item type |
Book |