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008			231128b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a0-691-03683-7
040			_aDDC _beng _cGUL _dTOSD
043			_an-us---
082	0	0	_a658.15 ROE _222
100	1		_aRoe, Mark J., _d1951- _0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n94034741
245	1	0	_aStrong managers, weak owners : _bthe political roots of American corporate finance / _cMark J. Roe.
264		1	_aPrinceton, N.J. : _bPrinceton University Press, _c[1994]
264		4	_c©1994
300			_axvi, 324 pages ; _c24 cm
337			_bn
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 289-308) and index.
505	0	0	_tThe Economic Paradigm -- _tDiffuse Ownership as Natural Economic Evolution -- _tFragmentation's Costs -- _tThe Political Paradigm -- _tDiffuse Ownership as Political Product -- _tA Political Theory -- _tThe Historical Evidence -- _tBanks -- _tInsurers -- _tBanks Again -- _tMutual Funds -- _tPension Funds -- _tThe Contemporary and Comparative Evidence -- _tTakeovers -- _tCorporate Ownershiphin Germany and Japan -- _tA Small Comparative Test of the Political Theory -- _tCounterpoint I -- _tPolitical Evolution in Germany and Japan? -- _tTrends in the United States -- _tAn American Crossroads -- _tPolicy Recommendations -- _tManagers as the Problem? -- _tShort-Term Finance as the Problem? -- _tIndustrial Organization as the Problem? -- _tCounterpoint II -- _tChanging the American Ownership Structure?
520	1		_a"The distinctive character of corporate business enterprise in the United States - large firms guided by powerful, centralized managers, historically deferential directors, and distant shareholders - is usually thought to be the inevitable result of economic and technological forces. In this major reinterpretation of the origins and evolution of corporate structure, Mark Roe shows that the nature of the American corporation derives not only from these forces but also from political decisions that made alternative forms of organization costly or illegal. Drawing upon work in economics, history, law, and political science, Roe argues that the role of politicians in mediating the interaction between firms and financiers is a critical, but neglected, part of the explanation why certain forms rather than others prevailed." "In their classic 1932 study, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means argued that the separation of ownership and control was the consequence of industrial technologies requiring large-scale production, which in turn led to highly dispersed stockholding. Roe demonstrates, however, that the ownership structure of the American corporation represents just one of several possible outcomes, and that other organizational forms arose abroad (in Germany and Japan, for example) under the influence of different political conditions. At a number of critical junctures, political choices were made about how savings were to be channeled to industry that sharply restricted the power of financial institutions to shape the growth of large firms. These decisions, which pre-dated the New Deal, going as far back in some cases as the nineteenth century, reflected the American public's enduring dislike of concentrated financial power. Once these rules for the governance of financial institutions were in place - but not before - the Berle-Means corporation became inevitable." "In recent years, new technological and competitive challenges have forced many of America's largest firms to restructure, often painfully. Some are now more efficient and productive, others are not. Relationships among shareholders, directors, and senior managers remain in flux, and tensions over whether shareholders are to have a greater or smaller voice in corporate management in the future may become acute. If history is any guide, Roe suggests, the issue will eventually be settled not only in boardrooms and on stock exchanges but also in statehouses and in Congress."--Jacket.
650		0	_aCorporations _zUnited States _0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85032958 _xFinance. _0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2002007885
942			_2ddc _cBOOK